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Abstract—Network function virtualization (NFV) is an emerg-
ing scheme to provide virtualized network function (VNF) ser-
vices for next-generation networks. However, finding an efficient
way to distribute different resources to customers is difficult. In
this paper, we develop a new double-auction approach named
DARA that is used for both service function chain (SFC)
routing and NFV price adjustment to maximize the profits of all
participants. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work
to adopt a double-auction strategy in this area. The objective of
the proposed approach is to maximize the profits of three types
of participants: NFV broker, customers and service providers.
Moreover, we prove that the approach is a weakly dominant
strategy in a given NFV market by finding the Bayesian Nash
equilibrium in the double-auction game. Finally, according to the
results of the performance evaluation, our approach outperforms
the single-auction mechanism with higher profits for the three
types of participants in the given NFV market.
Index Terms—Network function virtualization (NFV), Double
auction, Virtualized network function (VNF), Service function
chain (SFC), Resource allocation
I. INTRODUCTION
NETWORK function virtualization (NFV) is a newscheme for enhancing network scalability and flexibility
[1], [2], [3], [4]. Due to the high costs of providing storage
space and computational resources for traditional network
methods, it is becoming difficult to provide new full ser-
vices in the current networks [5], [6]. The development of
NFV introduces new approaches, along with other emerging
technologies, such as software-defined networks (SDNs) [7],
[8], [9] and cloud computing [10], to design, schedule and
manage network resources. NFV changes the traditional rules
for how network operators manage their infrastructure as
software instances separate from the hardware platform by
using the proven virtualization technology [11]. For example,
one example of an open platform for NFV (OPNFV), the
Huawei E9000 blade server, is widely applied in industry
and is intended to facilitate the commercial adoption of NFV
applications [12].
Virtualized network functions (VNFs) defined by the NFV
are virtualized tasks that are separated from network hardware,
which is provided by network service providers. In fact,
NFV distributes VNFs, including firewall, storage and routing,
executed on commodity hardware, as shown in Figure 1,
because a single VNF instance is not enough to providing a
valid service to the required customers [13]. Multiple VNFs,
instantiated without delay and equipment installation, can be
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connected to obtain chains of network services, called a service
function chain (SFC) [14], which is made-to-order for different
use cases [15], [16], [17]. Accompanying SFCs, an NFV
market is an emerging scheme in which the SFC broker has
geodistributed information of SFCs and then sells them to
users on demand, while SFC suppliers provide one or more
SFCs. The participants, including customers, the SFC broker
and service suppliers, play a game with each other for their
own benefits.
The development of NFV faces also several technical issues
in handling VNF, which is the most important component of
an SFC. Previous works [18], [19] have shown that although
the underlying network is lightly utilized, virtualization may
still lead to performance problems such as abnormal latency
variations and severe throughput jitter. Therefore, the first
problem of NFV is that the hardware and software may be
supported by different service providers, resulting in skewed
utilization, increased latency or unstable throughput. The
second problem is that when multiple suppliers manage the
virtualized resources in the network, it is difficult to coordinate
with suppliers to provide good service performance [20], [21].
To solve these problems, some industrial projects from
commercial companies attempt to define standards for the co-
ordination of suppliers [22], [23], [24]. However, the resource
utilization and service performance of these methods are not
sufficient to support the distribution of SFC in NFV market due
to inefficient scheduling strategies. Finding an efficient method
for scheduling available SFCs among independent suppliers
and to calculate the applicable price in the NFV market is chal-
lenging. In general, an auction-based method can improve the
efficiency of resource scheduling in a competitive environment
[25]. Compared with simple allocation using fixed pricing, an
auction mechanism provides more economical efficiency for
suppliers according to customer demands, flexible allocation
of SFCs and finer targeting of customers.
Therefore, in this paper, we present an auction-based re-
source scheduling method for guaranteeing resource utilization
and service performance in the NFV market. Although the
traditional single-auction method can improve the resource
utilization to schedule SFCs, it cannot guarantee the profits of
service suppliers. Rather than using single-auction methods,
a double-auction model can achieve a higher efficiency with
competitive bidding between customers and service suppliers.
A double-auction mechanism can model the interaction of
two or three parties well, where buyers request SFCs with
the bidding price, suppliers provide their services with the
asking price, and the broker decides the transaction value
[26]. Through competitive bidding and asking, the profit in
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Fig. 1. Double auction between service suppliers and customers in an NFV market
the double-auction method is higher than that in the single-
auction method.
Consequently, we first design an efficient double-auction
model in our resource scheduling method in which both
service suppliers and customers can participate in the auction
market. The main goal of our model is to maximize the
profits of the three participants when the auction mechanism
is incentive compatibility (IC).
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as
follows.
1) First, we propose the concept of the double-auction NFV
market and characterize the mutual effect between the
SFC broker, customers and resource suppliers. With this
concept, we can combine a large number of VNFs into
different service chains and then schedule them separately
for a customer in an NFV market.
2) We formulate a double-auction model with constraints of
customers and sellers to maximize the profits of the three
participants. To solve this model, we use three algorithms,
including auction, price adjustment and payment strategy,
to schedule network resources. We combine the normal
distribution element and the price adjustment to control
the auction progress. We also theoretically analyze the
effectiveness of our proposed method.
3) We conduct a comprehensive simulation to evaluate the
DARA resource scheduling method. The results confirm
that the DARA method outperforms the single-auction
model with respect to the profits of both participants.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
related works are discussed in Section II. We present the
related preliminaries in Section III. We introduce the resource
allocation problem in data center networks. We also propose
the DARA resource scheduling and pricing method with an
NFV performance constraint in Section IV. In Section V,
we design a double-auction mechanism containing the DARA
algorithm and a price adjustment to guarantee availability. We
present some numerical results in Section VI, and then we
demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed DARA method
through a mathematical analysis and comparison with the
single-auction model. Finally, we present the main conclusions
and future research directions in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Several large industrial projects, such as the European T-
elecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) and the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF), propose industry standards on
NFV in the form of white papers [27]. To solve the problem
of data traffic, the SFC working group of IETF [14] finds a
dynamic approach with a series of network functions to guide
the physical or virtualized data traffic. The resource scheduling
in this paper follows the framework and assumptions in these
white papers.
Gember et al. [28] propose programming a network-aware
orchestration layer called Stratos to deploy middleboxes in
the cloud for a virtual middlebox appliance. Stratos’s process
consists of three phases: determining the number of VNFs in
each type, deciding a better position for each type of VNF in
the cloud, and guiding the data traffic through service chains.
To solve the placement problem of VNFs, Ming Xia et al.
[29], [13] find a heuristic algorithm that can be efficiently
operated with binary integer programming (BIP). Moreover,
in their study, it is possible to minimize the cost of optical-
electronic-optical (O-E-O) conversions by using NFV chains
in optical data centers.
3Prior works mainly focus on the VNF deployment problem
from the perspective of resource allocation. In fact, social
welfare and resource market are the other mechanisms for
providing good service performance to competing customers,
and auctions have been regarded as a primary method.
Bari et al. [30] present two methods to solve the VNF or-
chestration problem (VNF-OP). The first method is an integer
linear programming (ILP) formulation with an implementa-
tion in IBM ILOG CPLEX Optimization Studio (CPLEX)
for small-scale networks. Second, for large-scale networks,
they also propose a heuristic algorithm based on dynamic
programming. Double-auction methods are widely used in dis-
tributing resources between competing customers and resource
suppliers. In [31], the authors propose an intelligent resource
allocation mechanism by building a double combinatorial
auction model based on a reputation system to avoid malicious
behavior. They also present a price decision mechanism based
on a backpropagation (BP) neural network to make decisions
scientifically. In [32], the authors introduce new resource
allocation mechanisms for three type of participants: providers,
tenants and end users.
To clearly minimize the costs of capital and operation,
SDN is first proposed based on the wireless virtualization
architecture, which can solve multiple flow transmission prob-
lems when there are multiple infrastructure providers and
multiple mobile virtual network operators [33]. Moreover, by
using a virtual resource allocation algorithm, the authors also
solve an optimization problem of social welfare, improving
the quality of service (QoS) requirements while reducing
transaction costs. Dong et al. [34] find a new caching device
named SRCMN to enhance the network performance under
constrained conditions in an SDN-enabled network. In [22],
the authors first propose an efficient and truthful auction
method to distribute resources dynamically and to price the
unit of transaction. To connect atomic network functions and
provide integrated services, they define NFV service chains in
a data center.
VNF orchestration and capital expense problems can be
solved as an auction model, and the double-auction model is
also an effective way to solve resource allocation problems.
In [35], the authors present a novel double-auction scheme
to protect the privacy of electric vehicles (EVs) and meet
the requirement of demand response. In the double-auction
market, the auctioneer matches buyers to sellers to achieve the
maximum social welfare. As an auctioneer, the cloud protects
the privacy between bidders and the auctioneer. Rather than
the traditional double-auction methods, the authors [36] first
adopt a game theory method to analyze the profits of the cloud
provider and customers, as well as state the profit functions.
Dou An et al. [37] propose a novel weakly dominant strategy-
based on-line double-auction (SODA) method in the smart
grid system to address the energy management issues with
microgrids. The theoretical analysis proves that SODA can
achieve high performance with (weak) budget balance and
computational efficiency.
Fu et al. present a new type of core-selecting virtual machine
(VM) combinatorial auction-based allocations [38] that can
economically and efficiently calculate bidder charges from the
core of the price vector space. In [39], the authors formulate
the problem of allocating virtual resources as an optimization
problem to maximize the total utility of the system. Then,
they transform the transaction cost problem into an iterative
double-auction problem. In this process, the bidding prices are
changed by the iterative computation according to their own
utility until the deal is closed. To solve the problems of SFC
positioning and pricing, Zhang et al. [23] propose a novel
auction mechanism in which the NFV provider owns resource
information and customers can bid stochastically online. This
mechanism significantly enhances the performance of existing
techniques, while both sellers and buyers occupy or supply
the VNF service chain in a limited time. M. Nazif Faqiry et
al. [40] introduce a general double-auction scheme to solve
the energy distribution problem among competing buyers,
sellers and agents in a microgrid. They create a suitable
projection objective function to maximize the total welfare of
participants, while the agents can sell or procure energy with
free bids in a selfish manner. By formulating a double-auction
mechanism, our main objective is to maximize the profit of
the SFC broker as an auctioneer in the NFV market. In the
auction mechanism, we also strive to guarantee the profits of
customers and resource suppliers.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this paper, we consider a centralized SFC broker who
collects resources from distributed service suppliers to obtain
maximum overall profit. As shown in Figure 1, customers re-
quest a certain ordered chain of VNFs; meanwhile, more than
one seller supplies resources for the required service chain.
Therefore, the customers are capable of choosing the price
for their requirements, while the SFC broker also desires a
higher profit. The SFC broker collects all the available service
chains and supplies them to the customers. Accordingly, we
can formulate a double-auction problem in this market.
We present our basic definitions and assumptions to describe
the formulation of the auction problem. We assume that there
are two or more service suppliers who can provide some
objects in a single cloud. Let J denote the set of sellers,
numbered 1, 2, ..., j, ...J , and J = {1, ..., J}. Sellers face
I buyers or potential buyers, numbered 1, 2, ..., i, ..., I . Let
I represent the set of buyers, and I = {1, ..., I}. We use
i to denote typical buyers in I . In the auction, we assume
that all sellers do not know the bidding and asking prices of
other buyers and sellers. We provide a precise definition of
the double-auction problem as follows.
Definition 1: A market consists of sellers, buyers, and a
broker, while a single auction consists of an auctioneer and
many buyers.
In a single-auction market, such as the English auction
market, bidding prices are increasing, and each subsequent
bidding price is greater than the previous one. If no buyer is
willing to continue bidding, the buyer with the highest bidding
price pays the bidding price and the auction ends. In a double-
auction market, buyers first present their bidding price, and
sellers submit their asking price to the auctioneer. Then, the
auctioneer chooses the hammer price, denoted by p, which is
4decided by the asking price and bidding price. Finally, price
p must satisfy the rule that the hammer price is higher than
the bidding price and less than the asking price. Thus, we
consider a double-auction approach for scheduling resources
in the NFV market. We assume that the double-auction model
in our paper is the truthful auction model based on IC.
Definition 2: An auction mechanism is IC if the dominant
strategy for all customers is to reveal its true valuation,
regardless of other buyers’ bidding [41].
Let b−i denote the bidding price of a given buyer except
buyer i. We use P (bi) : R → [0, 1] to denote the cumulative
distribution function corresponding to the density fi(·). Hence,
P (bi) =
∫ bi
−∞
fi(si)dsi. (1)
Theorem 1: The equivalent condition of the truthful auction
market is
1) The probability P (bi) of buyer i with price bi is mono-
tonically nondecreasing in bi;
2) The charge pi of buyer i is equal to
pi = biP (bi)−
∫ bi
0
P−i(b)db, (2)
where P (bi) is the probability that buyer i obtains the instance
and P−i(b) is the winning probability of a given buyer except
bi [42], [43].
Definition 3: A strategy for player i ∈ I is a map si : B →
Si, where si denotes an action for each player i, B denotes
the set of bidding prices, and Si is the strategy sequence set
[44].
Theorem 2: The strategy function s(·) is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium (BNE) if, for all i ∈ I and for all bi ∈ B, we
have the following equation:
si(bi) ∈ arg max
s′i∈Si
∑
b−i
f(b−i|bi)ui(s′i, s−i(b−i), bi, b−i),
(3)
where ui is the utilization function of buyer i [45].
IV. DOUBLE-AUCTION MODEL
In this section, we describe the double-auction model for
the NFV market. Participants in the market are customers,
resource suppliers, and the SFC broker. Customers have one or
more independent tasks for execution, and resource suppliers
have available resources. The SFC broker possesses geodis-
tributed information of SFCs and distributes and sells SFCs
based on the demands of the customer.
We formulate the SFC distribution in the NFV network with
a double-auction market to satisfy IC. There are K types of
SFCs, such as routing, firewall, and storage. There are three
assumptions in our model, as follows:
1. Each seller has enough SFCs for all buyers’ requests in
the truthful NFV auction market and sells the same SFC
to different buyers.
2. The SFC broker only places those SFCs from sellers
that satisfy requests of buyers. Therefore, in the auction
process, the constraints of SFCs, such as delay or service
capability, are always satisfied.
3. Buyers can purchase all required SFCs from the NFV
market after the auction process. Meanwhile, each buyer
only obtains one SFC from one seller.
Our model is formulated depending on Definition 2 and
Theorem 1. Let bki and a
k
j denote the bidding price and the
asking price for the k−th SFC, respectively. Every buyer i has
a private valuation denoted by dki and a hammer price denoted
by pki for the k−th SFC that satisfy
bki ≤ pki ≤ dki . (4)
The profit of buyer i for k−th SFC is uki = dki − pki ; thus,
the profit of buyer i is ui =
∑K
k=1 u
k
i . Therefore, the total
benefit of buyers is
UBuyer =
I∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
(dki − pki ). (5)
Seller j has a cost price denoted by ckj and a hammer price
denoted by pkj for the k−th SFC that satisfy
ckj ≤ pkj ≤ akj . (6)
The profit of seller j for k−th SFC is ukj = pki − cki ; thus,
the profit of seller j is uj =
∑K
k=1 u
k
j . Therefore, the total
benefit of sellers is
USeller =
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
(pkj − ckj ). (7)
Consider the case in which buyer i submits their first
bidding price bki for the k−th SFC and seller j simultaneously
submits their first asking price bki for the k−th SFC. If
bki ≥ akj , buyer i and seller j make a deal for the k−th SFC
with price pkij decided by the SFC broker in the range of
[akj , b
k
i ]. If b
k
i < a
k
j , buyer i and seller j have to adjust the
initial price. Buyer i has to increase their bidding price bki ,
and seller j has to bring the price down until the deal ends, as
shown in Figure 2(a) and Figure 2(b), respectively. The rate of
price adjustment in Figure 2(a) changes more slowly than the
rate in Figure 2(b). Thus, in these two price adjustments, the
range of hammer price decided by the SFC broker is different.
Clearly, the fast price adjustment is better for the broker to
select the appropriate hammer price from the larger range.
Therefore, we choose a fast price adjustment function from
the normal distribution as
a˜kj (n+ 1) = a
k
j (n)(1 +
∫ n
−∞
1√
2pi
e−(t−µ)
2
dt), and (8)
b˜ki (n+ 1) = b
k
i (n)(1−
∫ n
−∞
1√
2pi
e−(t−µ)
2
dt), (9)
where a˜kj and b˜
k
i are the prices after the price adjustments,
respectively. The number of auction rounds is denoted as n.
Let µ denote a constant parameter, and when t = µ, we
can obtain the maximum number of trades. With a suitable
parameter, we can achieve a tradeoff between the time of the
trade and the profits of the three participants in the market.
Let rkij denote whether buyer i and seller j make a deal
(rkij = 1) or do not make a deal (r
k
ij = 0). The profit of the
5Time
Price
Bidding price
Asking price
Transaction time
The range of hammer price
Private valuation
Cost price
The highest 
bidding price in 
this round
The lowest 
asking price in 
this round
(a) Slow price adjustment
Time
Price
Bidding price
Asking price
Transaction time
The range of hammer price
Cost price
The lowest 
asking price in 
this round
The highest 
bidding price in 
this round
Private valuation
(b) Fast price adjustment
Fig. 2. Price adjustments in double auction
SFC broker from buyer i and seller j for the k−th SFC is
(b˜ki − a˜kj )rkij . Thus, the profit of the SFC broker is as follows:
UNFV =
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
(bki − akj )rkij . (10)
Let γ denote the service charge per auction round to prevent
the price adjustment of buyers or sellers from having an
endless loop. When we acquire an appropriate service charge,
buyers and sellers can only choose to adjust the original
price to avoid overpaying for γ. Therefore, our objective is
to maximize the profits of the three participants in this paper
as follows:
max
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
(bki − akj )rkij + 2Nγ, (11)
max
K∑
k=1
I∑
i=1
(dki − pkij)rkij , and (12)
max
∑K
k=1
∑J
j=1
∑I
i=1 r
k
ij
J
, (13)
where N is the total number of auction rounds.
Equation (12) is to maximize the profit of buyers, and
Equation (13) is to maximize the trading ratio for sellers. From
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF NOTATIONS
Symbols Description
I The number of buyers.
J The number of servers.
K The number of SFCs.
I The set of buyer i.
J The set of seller j.
K The set of SFCs
bki The bidding price of the i−th buyer for the k−th SFC.
akj The asking price of the j−th seller for the k−th SFC.
dki The private valuation of the i−th buyer for the k−th SFC.
cki The cost price of the j−th seller for the k−th SFC.
pkij The hammer price of the k−th SFC between buyer i
and seller j.
rkij r
k
ij equals 1 when buyer i and seller j have a
deal for the k−th SFC, otherwise 0.
N The total number of auction rounds.
γ The service charge per auction round.
Pi(bi) The probability that buyer i achieves the resource
with price bi.
P−i(b) The probability that buyers except i achieve the resource
with price b.
fi(·) The probability density function of buyer i achieving
resource.
Equations (5) and (7), we can obtain the profits of buyers and
sellers as
UBuyer =
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
(dki − pkij)rkij −Nγ, and (14)
USeller =
I∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
(pkij − ckj )rkij −Nγ. (15)
To satisfy all requests from buyers, we assume that at least
one buyer provides a bidding price that is higher than the
minimum asking price, given by
max
i
bki ≥ min
j
akj . (16)
Finally, the profit maximization problem in the double-
auction model is given by
max
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
(bki − akj )rkij + 2Nγ, (17.1)
max
K∑
k=1
I∑
i=1
(dki − pkij)rkij , ∀j ∈J (17.2)
max
∑K
k=1
∑J
j=1
∑I
i=1 r
k
ij
J
. (17.3)
6s.t.
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
(dki − pkij)rkij −Nγ ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I ; (17a)
I∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
(pkij − ckj )rkij −Nγ ≥ 0, ∀j ∈J ; (17b)
rkij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i,∈ I , j ∈J , k ∈ K ; (17c)
bki ≤ pki ≤ dki , ∀i,∈ I , j ∈J , k ∈ K ; (17d)
ckj ≤ pkj ≤ akj , ∀i,∈ I , j ∈J , k ∈ K . (17e)
V. ALGORITHM
In this section, we present three algorithms to optimize the
profit in data center networks by adjusting the bidding price
and asking price. In our model, customers require SFCs with
corresponding VNFs, while service suppliers want the maxi-
mum profit. This problem is considered as a noncooperative
game, which is proven to be a weakly dominant strategy in
our algorithms. In Algorithm 1, we present the details of
the double-auction process. Algorithm 2 is the process of
price adjustment, which can output a feasible solution for
guaranteeing the profits of every buyer and seller. Algorithm
3 illustrates the process of searching the real value of SFCs,
and it is able to calculate the appropriate price to attract
customers. We also prove that these three algorithms guarantee
the performance of the auction process.
A. DARA Algorithm for ILP Problem (17)
We propose the DARA auction algorithm to solve the ILP
problem (17). First, we prove the following theorem that states
that there is no polynomial-time dynamic algorithm for the ILP
problem (17).
Theorem 3: The SFC broker profit maximization problem,
as shown in the ILP problem (17), is NP-hard.
Proof: An example of an NP-hard problems is the 0− 1
knapsack problem. As a typical optimization problem, it is
proven to be an NP-hard problem, given by
max
n∑
i=1
wixi
s.t.
n∑
i=1
wixi ≤W, ∀xi ∈ {0, 1}.
From the above equations, the 0 − 1 knapsack problem is
a special form of the ILP problem (17) with one constraint.
Thus, the SFC broker profit maximization problem is an NP-
hard problem.
From Theorem 3, we apply a game theory method to find
the equilibrium solution as Algorithm 1. First, we initialize
the demands of customers for different SFCs. As shown on
Lines 3-10, the algorithm resets set I of buyers for different
instances. Then, as the auctioneer in the market, the SFC
broker distinguishes buyers who want to buy the k−th SFC as
the while loop in Algorithm 1. In the distinguishing process,
when the SFC broker finds that one buyer bids a price greater
than the minimum asking price, the process of the auction
Algorithm 1 DARA auction algorithm for ILP problem (17)
Input: The numbers of buyers, sellers and SFCs; the demand
of buyers; the set of SFCs for sellers.
Output: The total profit of SFC.
1: for k in range(K) do
2: I = 0 ;
3: for i in range (I) do
4: if customer demand(i, k) is truth then
5: I = I + i;
6: else
7: I = I + 0;
8: end if
9: end for
10: while any(I ) do
11: if max bki ≥ min akj then
12: i∗ = argmax bki ;
13: j∗ = argmin akj ;
14: priceki∗j∗ ∈ [a(k, i∗), b(k, j∗)] decided by SFC
broker ;
15: rki∗j∗ = 1;
16: customer priceki∗ = price
k
i∗j∗r
k
i∗j∗ ;
17: if seller pricekj∗ 6= ckj∗ then
18: seller priceki∗j∗+ = price
k
i∗j∗r
k
i∗j∗ ;
19: else
20: seller pricekj∗ = price
k
i∗j∗r
k
i∗j∗ ;
21: end if
22: Profit of SFC broker is (bki∗ − akj∗) ∗ rki∗j∗ + (1−
charge) ∗ priceki∗j∗ ;
23: I = I /i;
24: else
25: The sellers and buyers adjusting price within their
limits;
26: end if
27: end while
28: end for
will continue, and two participants will be chosen to stop the
auction.
In the auction process, the customer needs to ask the SFC
broker for the geographical information of VNFs to know
the corresponding servers for the required SFCs. Only if the
bidding price is higher than other bidding prices, the lowest
asking price and the private value can the customer buy the
required SFC from the NFV market. At the same time, the
SFC broker records this purchase as Line 15 in Algorithm
1. Otherwise, the customer enters the second round or the
process of price adjustment as Line 25. From Lines 23 to
24, the algorithm calculates the total profit of the SFC broker
and updates the set of buyers. Next, we propose Theorem 4
to prove that the output of Algorithm 1 includes at least one
feasible solution.
Theorem 4: The output of Algorithm 1 is a feasible solution
to the ILP problem (17).
Proof: In Algorithm 1, rkij is a binary variable and
initialized to 0. Thus, there is no conflict with Equation
(17c). Next, we prove that the adjustment of price in Line
23 satisfies Equations (17d) and (17e). Our adjustment rules
7follow Equations (8) and (9), and we need to prove that there
must be an intersection point between adjusting the functions
of bidding and selling prices. From Equation (8), we know
that
a˜kj (n+ 1)
akj (n)
= 1 +
∫ n
−∞
1√
2pi
e−(t−µ)
2
dt, (19)
where
∫ n
−∞
1√
2pi
e−(t−µ)
2
dt is the cumulative function of
the Gaussian distribution, which is always greater than 0.
Therefore, the price adjusting function of sellers is monotoni-
cally decreasing. Similarly, the adjusting function of buyers
is monotonically increasing. Because of the assumption in
Equation (16), we conclude that there must be an intersection
point between the price adjusting functions for bidding and
selling.
Therefore, the total profit function of buyers without charge,
given by
Ubuyer =
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
(dki − pkij)rkij , (20)
is strictly greater than 0. Thus, there is at least one  > 0
satisfying Ubuyer ≥ . If  does not exist, then Ubuyer <  is
true for all . When we choose  given by
 =
∑J
j=1
∑K
k=1 (d
k
i − pkij)rkij
2
, (21)
we can find the contradiction as
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
(dki − pkij)rkij < 0. (22)
Therefore, there is at least one value to satisfy Equation
(17a), which is a charge for buyers in our model. For the same
reason, we also find the charge for sellers from Equation (17b).
Then, we prove that our algorithm can find a feasible
solution in polynomial time.
Theorem 5: Algorithm 1 can find a feasible solution in
polynomial time.
Proof: The loop from Line 1 to Line 28 in Algorithm 1
has K iterations. During the iteration, the loop from 12 to 27
has at most I rounds. Thus, the complexity of Algorithm 1 is
O(n2).
From Theorem 5, it is easy to know the time complexity of
Algorithm 1 based on the double-auction is O(n2). Compared
with the time complexity O(n2) of the single-auction-based
algorithm [22], Algorithm 1 is a slightly slower than methods
based on single auction in a general scale market. Therefore,
the increased profit with Algorithm 1 is able to cover the
additional computational cost.
B. Price Adjustment Algorithm for Algorithm 1
We propose a price adjustment algorithm to guarantee the
profits of all participants. In Algorithm 2, Line 3 and Line
11 are the main adjustment functions from Equation (8) and
Equation (9), considering the service charge γ. Due to the
significance of the normal distribution in statistics with random
variables [46], we utilize the normal distribution function
Algorithm 2 DARA price adjustment algorithm
Input: The bidding (asking) price of sellers and buyers
Output: The adjustment price of sellers and buyers
1: for j in range (J) do
2: if akj ≥ ckj and akj is not true then
3: akj = a
k
j (1 +
∫ n
−∞
1√
2pi
e−(t−µ)
2
dt) + γ;
4: if akj < ckj − γ then
5: akj = c
k
j ;
6: end if
7: end if
8: end for
9: for i in range (I) do
10: if bki ≥ dki and bki is not true then
11: bki = b
k
i (1−
∫ n
−∞
1√
2pi
e−(t−µ)
2
dt) + γ;
12: if bki < dki + γ then
13: bki = d
k
i ;
14: end if
15: end if
16: end for
to improve the flexibility of the price adjustment. If the
bidding price exceeds the sum of the private valuation and the
service charge, the SFC broker will terminate the transaction.
Similarly, if the asking price exceeds the difference between
the cost price and the service charge, the transaction will be
terminated.
We use an example to illustrate Algorithm 2 for a better
understanding. The bidding prices of buyers are presented in
Table II, where “ − ” denotes that the buyer has no request
for the corresponding resource.
TABLE II
REQUESTS OF BUYERS
bi Buyer 1 Buyer 2 Buyer 3 Buyer 4
Resource 1 13295 12874 - 13671
Resource 2 - - - -
Resource 3 - - - 13366
Resource 4 13072 - 12617 -
TABLE III
RESOURCES OF SELLERS
aj Supplier 1 Supplier 2
Resource 1 19106 15845
Resource 2 15756 18682
Resource 3 19668 -
Resource 4 - -
Similarly, the asking prices are shown in Table III, where
the container {1, 2, 0, 4} for resource 1 means that the buyers
numbered {1, 2, 4} need to buy resource 1. Because the
bidding prices are less than the lowest asking price, buyers
and sellers have to enter the price adjustment process. Then,
the buyers adjust the original prices of resource 1, as shown in
Table IV. Similarly, the asking price for resource 1 is shown
in Table V. Thus, buyer 4 and resource supplier 2 reach an
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REQUESTS FOR RESOURCE 1
bi Buyer 1 Buyer 2 Buyer 3 Buyer 4
Resource1 20000 19000 - 21000
TABLE V
RESOURCE 1 FOR SUPPLIER
aj Supplier 1 Supplier 2
Resource 1 9600 7900
agreement for resource 1.
Then, we prove the correctness of the price adjustment
strategy.
Theorem 6: For customers and resource suppliers, the price
adjustment strategy is the weakly dominant strategy.
Proof: In this game, the SFC broker has a simultaneous
price adjustment strategy that includes cooperation (C) and
defection (D) for buyers and sellers. Cooperation means that
the player decides to accept the given strategy, and defection
means that the given strategy is rejected. If all buyers and sell-
ers choose cooperation, they both earn profits with probabili-
ties of P (Cbuyer|Cseller) and P (Cseller|Cbuyer), respectively.
If buyers and sellers reject the strategy, the probabilities of the
profits for buyers and sellers are given by P (Dbuyer|Dseller)
and P (Dseller|Dbuyer), respectively. If one participant accepts
the strategy while the other rejects the strategy, then the
probability that the cooperative participant can obtain the
profit is given by P (Cbuyer|Dseller) or P (Cseller|Dbuyer).
Similarly, the probability that the defective participant can
obtain the profit is P (Dbuyer|Cseller) or P (Dseller|Cbuyer).
According to the prisoner’s dilemma game, we need to
prove the following aspects:
(a) The probability that a buyer accepts the pricing adjust-
ment strategy is always higher than the probability of
rejection, given by
P (Cbuyer|Dseller) ≥ P (Cbuyer|Cseller)
≥ P (Dbuyer|Dseller) ≥ P (Dbuyer|Cseller).
(23)
(b) The probability that a seller accepts the pricing adjust-
ment strategy is always higher than the probability of
rejection, given by
P (Cseller|Dbuyer) ≥ P (Cseller|Cbuyer)
≥ P (Dseller|Dbuyer) ≥ P (Dseller|Cbuyer).
(24)
(c) The probability that a cooperative buyer can obtain the
profit with a cooperative seller or a cooperative seller
with a cooperative buyer is higher than the probability
of a cooperative buyer with a noncooperative seller or a
noncooperative seller with a cooperative buyer, give by
P (Cbuyer|Cseller) + P (Cseller|Cbuyer)
≥ P (Cbuyer|Dseller) + P (Dseller|Cbuyer),
(25)
The probability that a cooperative buyer can obtain the
profit with a cooperative seller or a cooperative seller
with a cooperative buyer is higher than the probability
of a noncooperative buyer with a cooperative seller or a
cooperative seller with a noncooperative buyer, given by
P (Cbuyer|Cseller) + P (Cseller|Cbuyer)
≥ P (Dbuyer|Cseller) + P (Cseller|Dbuyer).
(26)
Let A = {Cbuyer, Dbuyer} and G = {Cseller, Dseller} de-
note the sets of strategies for the buyer and seller, respectively.
From Bayes formula [47], we know that
P (Cbuyer|Dseller) = P (Cbuyer)P (Dseller|Cbuyer)
P (Dseller)
, (27)
where
P (Dseller) =P (Cbuyer)P (Dseller|Cbuyer)
+ P (Dbuyer)P (Dseller|Dbuyer).
(28)
Accordingly, we show the probability matrix in Table VI.
For all buyers and sellers, the auction success is not only
TABLE VI
PROBABILITY MATRIX
(Buyer, Seller) Cooperation (C) Defection (D)
Cooperation (C) (P (Cbuyer|Cseller) (P (Dbuyer|Cseller)
, P (Cseller|Cbuyer)) , P (Cseller|Dbuyer))
Defection (D) (P (Cbuyer|Dseller) (P (Dbuyer|Dseller)
, P (Dseller|Cbuyer)) , P (Dseller|Dbuyer))
based on their own prices but also others’ prices. Thus, every
participant adjusts the price in the dominant strategy. We
determine the equilibrium strategy of every participant based
on Bayes game theory.
In the model, because buyers and sellers only have a
common knowledge, our model is based on a symmetric
independent private value (SIPV) [48] model with a typical
static Bayesian game. Hence, the probability of buyer i∗ with
bidding price bki∗ for the k−th SFC is based on price bi or aj ,
i 6= i∗, i = 1, ..., I; j = 1, ..., J . Generally, we need to prove
items (a) and (c).
We propose the expectation profit function of buyer i as
Ui = (di − bi)Pr(bi ≥ bj , j 6= i), (29)
where Pr(.) is the extreme probability.
Thus, we can calculate that the probability that a cooper-
ative buyer can obtain the profit and the probability that a
cooperative seller can obtain the profit as
P (Cbuyer) =
I∏
i=1
Pr(bi ≥ bi∗ , i∗ 6= i) =
I∏
i=1
Ui(di)
(di − bi) , (30)
P (Cseller) =
J∏
i=j
Pr(aj ≤ aj∗ , j∗ 6= j) =
J∏
j=1
Uj(aj)
(cj − aj) ,
(31)
Ui(di) = [di − pi]P I−1(di), (32)
Uj(cj) = [pj − aj ]P J−1(aj), (33)
where P I−1(·) is the probability distribution function.
Then, we compute the value of P (·) as
P (di) =
1√
2piδ
e−
(di−di∗ )2
2piδ2 , (34)
9P (cj) =
1√
2piδ
e−
(cj−cj∗ )2
2piδ2 , (35)
where δ is a constant value. Thus, we know that
P (Cbuyer)
P (Cseller)
≈ 1. (36)
Accordingly, we change item (c) as follows:
2P (Cbuyer|Cseller) ≥P (Cbuyer|Dseller)
+ P (Dseller|Cbuyer).
(37)
Since the bidding prices of buyers are generally different,
buyer i has a bidding function bi = Bi(di), where di
is the private valuation. Thus, the strategy of buyer i is
{B1(d1), B2(d2), ..., BI(dI)}. According to the BNE theo-
rem, if buyer i knows that other competitors adopt strat-
egy B∗j (dj) ∈ {B∗1(d1), B∗2(d2), ..., B∗I (dI)}, j 6= i, j =
1, 2, ..., I , buyer i will also adopt strategy B∗i (di). We can
obtain P (Dbuyer|Cseller) = 0 and P (Cbuyer|Dseller) = 1.
Thus, Theorem 6 is proven based on Equations (37) and (36).
C. DARA Payment Strategy Algorithm
Next, we are supposed to guarantee that our method is able
to obtain the accurate price of the SFC for every buyer. This
algorithm focuses on the real value of the SFC. From Equation
(2), we just need to find a threshold value b∗i in our scheduling.
pi =
{
b∗, bi ≥ b∗i ;
0, others.
(38)
We compute the real value based on the following Algo-
rithm 3.
Because the buyer only makes a requirement in the truthful
auction mechanism, the SFC broker should find the real value
of the SFC for attracting customers. First, we compute the
difference between the high value and the low value in the
NFV market. If the difference is greater than a constant value
, we need to halve the price and then run Algorithm 1 until
we find the real value of the SFC.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we study the NFV service chain in the
double-auction market where customers can share SFCs. Each
SFC contains three types of resources: storage, routing and
firewall. We generate the matrix of bidding prices and asking
prices following a random distribution.
First, we compare the resource allocation performance be-
tween the DARA model and the single-auction model with
different numbers of buyers. Figure 3(a) shows the profit of
the SFC broker when the number of buyers is changed with
different auction models. It shows the profit of the SFC broker
with 100 service suppliers and 100 types of SFCs. From the
results, the profit of the SFC broker is increased with more
buyers. This result occurs because the profit of the SFC broker
mainly comes from the buyers. The solid blue line shows the
optimal solution of the profit of the SFC broker maximization
problem, and the solid red line is the profit of the SFC broker
Algorithm 3 DARA payment strategy algorithm
Input: The highest prices of sellers and buyers
Output: The truthful prices of sellers and buyers
1: all of i, j, k in their limits;
2: pkij = 0;
3: for all k ∈ [K] do
4: for all i ∈ [I] do
5: for all j ∈ [J ] do
6: if rkij == 1 then
7: s bki∗ = mini b
k
i ;
8: t bki∗ = maxi b
k
i ;
9: s skj∗ = minj a
k
j ;
10: t skj∗ = maxj a
k
j ;
11: while (s bki − t bki > ) do
12: Run Algorithm 1 with (s b
k
i∗+t b
k
i∗ )
2 ;
13: if Buyer i wins then
14:
t bki∗=(s b
k
i∗+t b
k
i∗ )
2 ;
15: else
16:
s bki∗=(s b
k
i∗+t b
k
i∗ )
2 ;
17: end if
18: if Seller j wins then
19:
t skj∗=(s s
k
j∗+t s
k
j∗ )
2
20: else
21:
s ski∗=(s s
k
i∗+t s
k
i∗ )
2 ;
22: end if
23: end while
24: pki∗j∗ =
rkij(t b
k
i∗+s b
k
i∗+t s
k
j∗+s s
k
j∗ )
4
25: end if
26: end for
27: end for
28: end for
calculated by the single-auction model. As shown, the profit
of the SFC broker in the DARA model is always higher than
the profit in the single-auction model.
In addition to the results shown in Figure 3(a), we also
compare the resource allocation performance between the
DARA model and the single-auction model with different
numbers of sellers in Figure 3(b). In contrast to the previous
results, the profit of the SFC broker changes erratically when
we increase the number of sellers. This result occurs because
the sellers are not the main factor of the SFC broker profit.
It also shows that the profit of the SFC broker in the DARA
model is always higher than the profit in the single-auction
model.
As shown in Figure 3(c), the profit of the SFC broker is
increased by more VNFs. This figure shows the profit of the
SFC broker in the DARA model is always higher than the
profit in the single-auction model.
Figure 4(a), Figure 4(b) and Figure 4(c) show the propor-
tionality factors between the DARA model and the single-
auction model. In Figure 4(a) and Figure 4(c), the line is
irregular due to the random training data, while the value of
proportionality is always greater than 1. From Figure 4(b),
compared to the results in the other figures, the value of
proportionality is decreased with more sellers. This result
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Fig. 4. The VNF profit proportionality affected by different participants compared between DARA model and single-auction model
occurs because the number of sellers cannot impact the profit
of the SFC broker.
We finally compare the profits of sellers and buyers between
the DARA model and the single-auction model. The empirical
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the profit of sellers
and buyers is shown in Figure 5. From the results shown
in Figure 5(a), the proposed scheme outperforms the single-
auction model. Furthermore, we observe that the probability
of the profits for sellers who earn nothing in the DARA model
is approximately equal to 0.1. Moreover, the proportion of the
seller profit increases gradually, and approximately 90% of
sellers obtain 2.5 × 106 profit. Thus, every seller can obtain
some benefits in the DARA model. However, in the single-
auction model, the proportion of low-income sellers accounts
for up to 90% of the population. Because we assume that one
seller can provide resources to a different customer, the blue
line is like a “stair-step” graph. Similar to the seller profit
analysis, in Figure 5(b), we also present the CDF of buyer
profit to show that the profit of more than 80% buyers is less
than 1×106 in the single-auction model, while more than 95%
buyers can achieve more than 1 × 106 profit in the DARA
model.
In general, we find that the DARA model performs better
than the single-auction model due to the limitation of the
single-auction model in which only customers can change the
price. Our results show that we can achieve the main goal,
which is to maximize the profits of the three participants.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we formulate an auction model that connects
VNFs to maximize the profits of the three participants. We
use a double-auction method called the DARA mechanism to
schedule resources in the NFV market. The DARA method
is effective according to the theoretical analysis and perfor-
mance evaluation. Compared with the single-auction model,
the DARA model increases the profits of customers and
resource suppliers in NFV markets.
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